Security researchers have demonstrated a faster way to undermine certain RSA deployments without factoring the public modulus, challenging the assumption that RSA’s practical strength always tracks the cost of integer factorization. The attack converts temporary access to a raw, unpadded RSA signing or decryption service into a lasting capability to forge signatures or decrypt chosen ciphertexts offline. Laura Shea, Miro Haller, Adam Suhl, Nadia Heninger and Emmanuel Thomé implemented the technique against a 1,024-bit RSA key. Their computation consumed 1,380 CPU core-years over five months and required 232 oracle queries. By comparison, factoring a 1,024-bit RSA modulus is estimated to require roughly 500,000 to one million...
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